Five theses on European Neighbourhood Policy by Gromadzki, Grzegorz
W a r s a w ,  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 8
F u n d a c j a  B a t o r e g o
B a t o r y  F o u n d a t i o n
analiza
F u n d a c j i  B a t o r e g o
policy brief
B a t o r y  F o u n d a t i o n
Five theses on European Neighbourhood 
Policy
Grzegorz Gromadzki
The four years existence of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
although not excessively long, gives grounds to make an appraisal. 
The European Union Neighbourhood Policy embraces 15 countries1 
as well as the Palestinian Autonomy which does not have the sta-
tus of a country. They are situated in two regions: Eastern Europe 
and the Southern coast of the Mediterranean. Representatives of the 
European Union Commission have on numerous occasions under-
lined the positive significance of the ENP in strengthening relations 
with European Union (EU) neighbours, bearing in mind the signing of 
Action Plans and other documents with specific countries. However 
EU policy has met with both fierce criticism in certain neighbouring 
countries and doubts in at least several member states. The events in 
Georgia, which is embraced by the ENP, in an even harsher manner 
than to date compel to freshly reflect on how much the EU can posi-
tively influence its neighbours, and to what extent it is helpless as to 
the actions of others, in this instance Russia.
Discussions among experts regarding EU activities towards its 
neighbours are becoming more and more enlivened. Recently sev-
eral analyses have been carried out concerning the ENP, the French 
initiative – Union for the Mediterranean as well as the Polish-
Swedish Eastern Partnership proposal. While attempting to evaluate 
1 In alphabetical order they are: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, 
Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and 
Ukraine.
 See Barbara Lippert, European Neighbourhood Policy: Many reservations 
– some progress – uncertain prospects, Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, June 008, 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/0546.pdf; Kerry Longhurst, Injecting More 
Differentiation in European Neighbourhood Policy: What Consequences for 
Ukraine?, Russie.Nei.Visions no. 3, IFRI, July 008, http://www.ifri.org/files/Rus-
sie/ifri_longhorst_ENP_ENG_june008.pdf; Roberto Aliboni et al., Union for the 
Mediterranean. Building on the Barcelona acquis, ISS Report no. 1, 13 May 008, 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ISS_Report01.pdf; Michael Emerson, 
Making sense of Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean, CEPS Policy brief, No. 
155, March 008,  http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=164; Kai-Olaf 
Lang, Eine Partnerschaft für den Osten. Der polnisch-schwedische Vorschlag zur 
Vertiefung der Kooperation mit den östlichen Nachbarn der EU, SWP-Aktuell 
66, July 008, http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_
id=5163
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the ENP it is possible to analyze in detail the 
content and execution of the aforementioned 
Action Plans and agreements signed by the EU 
with particular neighbours and reflect on the 
effectiveness of EU aid for these countries.  It 
may well be that the putting forward of sev-
eral, sometimes controversial, theses will be 
just as fruitful and help to better understand 
the basis of the problems and challenges fac-
ing the EU in its relations with countries en-
compassed by the ENP.  
Firstly – the ENP is not the only EU policy to-
wards its neighbours. The EU has at least four 
policies for its direct neighbours:
• concerning European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA)/European Economic Area (EEA)
• its enlargement policy as regards the Western 
Balkans and Turkey
• policy towards Russia
• and finally in relation to the ENP
In order to properly understand the ENP a wid-
er perspective is required where the EU’s rela-
tions with other neighbours have their proper 
place.
Secondly – from the very beginning of the 
existence of the ENP the problem of its cohe-
sion has been clearly evident.  On many occa-
sions the reason behind the existence of one 
policy for regions so very different such as the 
Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Europe 
has been strongly criticized. The French pro-
posal of the  Union for the Mediterranean an-
nounced in 007 as well as the Polish-Swedish 
Eastern Partnership initiative presented in May 
008 are both expressions of the ever more 
noticeable need to distinguish the two com-
ponents of the ENP – Southern and Eastern.
Thirdly – the EU has in the last four years 
presented Eastern European countries – par-
ticularly Ukraine and Moldova – with a pro-
position that the Southern countries did not 
receive. Included among these propositions is 
the pledge to introduce in a longer perspecti-
ve visa free travel included in visa facilitation 
agreements as well as the proposal that both 
countries should join the Energy Community 
created especially for Western Balkan coun-
tries. It is almost impossible to imagine that 
the Southern countries would receive similar 
proposals regarding visa free travel. It is also 
very improbable that the South will be inclu-
ded in the EU gas and electricity market which 
is actually the aim of the Energy Community 
in the case of Western Balkan countries. It can 
therefore be stated that an unnamed package 
for Ukraine and Moldova has been created, fa-
vouring them among the countries within the 
EPN, which no one officially mentions, and 
perhaps are not even aware of its existence.  
Fourthly – within the ENP there are actually 
three policies. The partition does not end with 
differentiation between the South and East. In 
the framework of the second region a clearly 
defined partition can be seen with Ukraine and 
Moldova on the one hand and countries of the 
Southern Caucasus on the other. It can there-
fore be stated that we are dealing with three 
policies: as regards Mediterranean countries, 
concerning Ukraine, Moldova (and eventually 
Belarus if democracy becomes a fact in that co-
untry) and towards the Southern Caucasus. 
Fifthly – many things indicate that in the fu-
ture we will witness further separation of the 
South and East. The future of the Southern 
Caucasus is unclear and it will either have a 
minor role in EU neighbourhood activity or 
to a lesser or greater degree join Ukraine and 
Moldova. The logic behind EU activity sug-
gests that another proposal will be offered to 
Ukraine and Moldova if commitments are ful-
filled on the current offer. This can naturally 
lead to the question of their EU membership. 
In the instance of the South there is a real 
threat of ‘Russification’ of relations with the 
EU, in other words the creation of new poli-
tical initiatives and institutions – as occurred 
as regards relations between the EU-Russia, 
which will exist only on paper and be seen as 
an indication of the deepening of relations be-
tween the EU and North Africa and the Middle 
East. 
The opinion can be hazarded that the fulfilling 
of the EU proposals by Eastern European co-
untries, which the EU has only offered to co-
untries of that region will be the beginning 
of the end of the ENP in its current concept 
as a common policy for countries of Eastern 
Europe and the Southern Mediterranean. 
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The first thesis
While examining the ENP it is important to 
underline that this is not the only EU policy 
as regards its immediate neighbours. The 
EU actually has various approaches to differ-
ent neighbours. Four specific policies stand 
out as regards its immediate surroundings. 
It would seem that their basic determinant is 
the possibility of future membership of the 
EU or the lack of such. The first policy is the 
policy as regards the EFTA countries (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland)/EEA 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway). They are 
based on far going integration without actu-
al membership which the member countries 
of EFTA/EEA do not desire. It is worth noting 
that the EFTA/EEA countries could become EU 
members almost overnight as they are better 
prepared to be part of the EU than some of the 
current member countries.  
The second is the enlargement policy which 
above all concerns the Western Balkans 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia). This 
also includes Turkey. But in the case of Turkey 
as opposed to the Western Balkans, politi-
cal decision in a number of member states is 
still lacking as regards the future accession of 
Turkey to the EU
The third is aimed at Russia. It differs from the 
policies above in that there is no mention of 
eventual membership. This point of view is 
shared by both the EU and Russia, which wants 
to be treated as an equal partner with the EU, 
and not as a country attempting to integrate 
with the EU. This is also the reason behind 
the lack of interest by Russia in accepting EU 
standards. 
And finally there is the ENP, which encom-
passes all the neighbouring countries which 
do not fall into any of the previous catego-
ries. The ENP includes countries which have 
not received the perspective of becoming EU 
members (originally Russia was also to be part 
of the ENP but refused as it did not want to 
be treated by the EU on an equal footing with 
Tunisia or Moldova). Representatives of EU in-
stitutions as well as politicians from numerous 
member states emphasize that the ENP is not 
a policy leading to EU membership, although 
in the instances of European countries which 
are part of the ENP, accession to the EU is not 
excluded in the unspecified future. Such state-
ments express the ‘enlargement fatigue’ clear-
ly visible currently in the EU and at the same 
time a clear lack by the EU to take a  univocal 
stance as regards the eventual membership of 
the EU by Eastern European countries. In this 
context the understandable impatience of pol-
iticians, above all from the Ukraine towards 
the ENP, which in their view is an obstacle on 
the road to membership, is comprehendible. 
In reality the ENP, using partially solutions ac-
cepted from the policy regarding enlargement 
as a basis, can be of assistance to neighbour-
ing countries in their preparation to join the 
EU. 
The second thesis
One of the fundamental problems of the ENP 
from its outset is the cohesion of the group 
of countries it encompasses. The differen-
ces between Eastern European and Southern 
Mediterranean coastal countries are obvious. 
Discontent with the union of East and South 
is visible above all else in the Eastern coun-
tries within the ENP, particularly in Ukraine 
and Moldova. Politicians of these countries 
constantly emphasize that they are a part of 
Europe in contrast to North Africa and the 
Middle East. But discontent of the wide geo-
graphical range of the ENP is also noticeable 
in South Mediterranean countries. Numerous 
politicians from these countries prefer rela-
tions with an EU that is limited to their own 
region, rather than belong to the amorphous 
ENP. This in no way indicates idealization by 
them of the   Barcelona Process, which is often 
met with criticism, but they understand that 
there is a framework for discussion with the 
EU from within it regarding issues which are 
important for their region, without the rather 
exotic, from their point of view, presence of 
representatives from Armenia or Moldova. It 
seems that representatives of European insti-
tutions and member countries are aware of 
the fundamental shortcomings of the ENP. This 
is why a strong emphasis has been placed on 
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individual relations with particular countries. 
It can be frankly stated that, the EU within the 
framework of the ENP prefers bilateral rela-
tions with specific countries rather than multi-
lateral activities. Countries that cooperate well 
with the EU can receive more than countries 
which cooperate at a lower or worse level. 
Accordingly this can lead to significant diffe-
rences in the level of relations between the EU 
and certain countries within the ENP. It must 
be emphasized that, according to officially an-
nounced postulations, EU proposals available 
within the framework of the ENP must be the 
same for all its participants, irrelevant of their 
geographical location.  
In spite of efforts by the EU a rift between the 
South and East is becoming ever greater. More 
and more advocates are becoming convinced 
of the need for a revitalization of relations with 
the neighbours from the South. To a certain 
extent an answer to this postulate is the idea 
of president Sarkozy to form a Union for the 
Mediterranean. The new proposal is certainly 
linked to the lack of progress in the Barcelona 
Process, and is also a direct and clear criticism of 
the ENP. Whereas the Polish-Swedish proposal 
of an Eastern Partnership is aimed at deepen-
ing relations with Eastern European countries 
which are part of the ENP. This is in part a re-
turn to the concept of the New Neighbourhood 
Policy from March 00, which was the begin-
ning of a discussion which ended with the for-
mation of the ENP. The New Neighbourhood 
Policy, which Sweden was one of the countries 
behind this concept, was to be applicable to 
only new, European EU neighbours in the East 
– Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. In this con-
cept there was no mention of African or Asian 
countries in the Mediterranean region. The 
Polish diplomatic corps when putting forward 
the concept of the Eastern Partnership referred 
to the German proposal of several years ago of 
European Neighbours, i.e. Eastern European 
countries  and Neighbours of Europe which in-
clude the Mediterranean countries which are 
part of the ENP.
The political decisions which were made 
in Copenhagen during the EU summit in 
December 00 regarding the joining of the 
East and South in the framework of one pol-
icy, which directly led to the creation of the 
ENP, was an attempt to reach a compromise 
internally within the EU, as regards the com-
mitment of the EU to its Southern and Eastern 
neighbours.  The EU policy came about above 
all else due to the apprehension of southern 
EU member countries, that after enlargement 
in 004 the Eastern neighbours will become 
more important than the Southern. Today 
this mode of thinking seems to be disap-
pearing into the past. A full circle has been 
made from the Barcelona Process and the 
New Neighbourhood Policy – two separate 
concepts for the South and East, via the ENP 
common to both regions to the Union for the 
Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership. 
But beaurocratic inertia and unwillingness to 
officially say farewell to the ENP in its current 
form makes the introduction and carrying out 
of radical reforms difficult.  
The third thesis
The different treatment of the East and South 
by the EU was a fact even before the appear-
ance of the Union for the Mediterranean and 
the Eastern Partnership proposals. It can even 
be said that a special packet was prepared 
for the Ukraine and Moldova (and eventually 
Belarus if democracy becomes a fact in that 
country). Obviously it was never given an offi-
cial name nor officially announced. It consists 
of at least two proposals, which the Southern 
countries belonging to the ENP did not re-
ceive. The first concerns visa policy. Ukraine 
and Moldova have signed Visa Facilitation 
Agreements with the EU, including a note al-
lowing for visa free movement as a long term 
aim. Apart from Ukraine and Moldova, similar 
agreements with similar notes have only been 
made by the EU with Russia and the Western 
Balkans. Southern ENP countries do not have 
such prospects. The second proposal from the 
EU for Ukraine and Moldova is admittance 
of these countries to the Energy Community, 
which the EU called into being in October 
005 in order to integrate the Western Balkan 
countries with the common electricity and 
gas markets which the EU forms. Asides from 
Ukraine and Moldova only Norway and Turkey 
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have been proposed full membership of the 
Energy Community.  
Both issues – energy and freedom of move-
ment – are of fundamental importance in 
EU relations with the outside world. The EU 
proposals lead not only to the strengthening 
of cooperation but also directly to the grad-
ual integration of Ukraine and Moldova with 
the EU. Particularly in the case of the Energy 
Community, where we are dealing with inte-
gration rather than closer cooperation.  These 
proposals go beyond the ENP because, as has 
been stated above, they have not been offered 
to all countries which fall within this policy. At 
the same time they are a contradiction of the 
basic foundations of the ENP, which are based 
on the existence of equal opportunities for all 
countries which participate in this policy.     
It is worth noting that, Ukraine and Moldova 
have received the same propositions as coun-
tries which are prospective candidates for 
membership – Western Balkans (Turkey) or the 
EFTA member – Norway. It can be concluded 
that the unnamed package places Ukraine and 
Moldova ‘between’ the remaining ENP coun-
tries and the Western Balkans and the EFTA 
countries.  
Additionally the matter of free trade zones 
is worthy of mention here. Although both 
Eastern and Southern European countries have 
received promises of receiving such zones, it is 
much more likely in the instance of the first 
countries, an example of which is the opening 
of negotiations with Ukraine.
The appearance of a special proposal/packet 
for Ukraine and Moldova is the result of two 
matters: democratic changes which have oc-
curred in these countries in recent years, the 
symbol of which is the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine, as well as the role these countries, 
and Ukraine in particular, play in the EU in-
ternal policies such as energy. The existence 
of the unnamed package is proof of the sepa-
ration from official policy and actual activity 
conducted by the EU. 
 
The fourth thesis
The problem the ENP is faced with is not just a 
matter of lack of cohesion between the South 
and East. There is also the issue of the Southern 
Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia), which do not fit into any of the 
two groups mentioned previously. Initially 
their participation in the ENP was not taken 
into consideration, evidence of which is the 
Commission Communication on Wider Europe 
from March 003, where there is no mention 
of these countries. They only became part of 
the ENP mainly due to changes in Georgia as a 
result of the Rose Revolution, which occurred 
in November 003. Theoretically they should 
be closer to Ukraine and Moldova. They are 
also countries which emerged from the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union. They are members 
of the Council of Europe. But it is characteristic 
that they did not receive the same proposal 
as Ukraine and Moldova in the so called ‘un-
named packet’. However it should be noted 
that Georgia received the status of observer 
in the Energy Community in December 007, 
which in the future can lead to it becoming 
a member of this institution, as well vague 
proposals on visa facilitations measures and 
full and comprehensive free trade area, result-
ing from the EU emergency summit held on 1 
September 0083.  
For obvious reasons, mainly geographically, 
they are not regarded as Northern African 
or Middle Eastern countries encompassed by 
the ENP. The EU still has no clear vision as to 
whether they should be treated on an equal 
footing with Ukraine and Moldova or be just 
left as a specific ‘subgroup’ in the East. 
It can there be said that, de facto we have 
three policies within the ENP. One as regards 
the Mediterranean countries, a second con-
cerning Ukraine and Moldova (and eventually 
Belarus if democracy becomes a fact in that 
country) and a third for the Southern Caucasus 
countries.  
The fifth thesis
A very probable scenario is further differentia-
tion in future EU policies as regards the South 
and East (with an unknown in the instance of 
3 See summit conclusions: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/
ec/10545.pdf
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the Southern Caucasus). Such development 
of events will be a result of the proposals cur-
rently on the table for Ukraine and Moldova, 
which upon there implementation, will mean 
that the relations of these two countries with 
the EU will be on an entirely different level than 
the countries from the South. Additionally the 
dissimilarity of the challenge standing before 
the EU in the case of Eastern Europe on one 
hand and the Southern Mediterranean on the 
other will lead to further differentiation in EU 
activities in these regions. 
As regards the South there is a real threat that 
EU relations with this region will more and 
more come to resemble the negative side of 
relations that the EU has with Russia, based 
on raising new political initiatives which rath-
er than leading to better cooperation will ex-
ist only on paper, which in effect is a symbol 
of crisis in the mutual relations. The raising of 
new political initiatives, the signing of con-
secutive documents and successive meetings, 
often at a high level, which supersede the im-
plementation of new solutions such as, by way 
of example, free trade zones which in reality 
strengthen cooperation. Currently there is an 
enlivened discussion as to what will be the add-
ed value of the Union for the Mediterranean in 
relation to the Barcelona Process and propos-
als rising from the ENP. The opinion is often 
repeated, that it will just be an altered form 
containing the same old substance. A large 
amount of pragmatism will be needed by the 
EU in its relations with the South. Real conces-
sions will have to be made by the EU towards 
the Southern countries regarding trade mat-
ters, especially concerning access to the EU ag-
ricultural products market. It is a paradox that 
this would require a change of stance – more 
flexibility, especially on the part of the south-
ern EU member countries, which on the one 
hand are most interested in dialogue with the 
North African and Middle Eastern countries, 
but on the other hand are wary of competition 
from the south in agriculture and farming. 
Deepening of economic cooperation could 
in part improve political relations with the 
Southern countries, but radical breakthroughs 
are unlikely in the next decade.  
In the case of Eastern Europe the eventual 
fulfilment of the current package by Ukraine 
and Moldova will naturally lead to further 
proposals from the EU, such as the European 
Economic Area Plus proposed in the Elmar 
Brok report, whose coming into being would 
merge Ukraine and Moldova into the com-
mon market4. Such activities by the EU will in 
a natural fashion lead to deeper integration of 
those countries with the EU. Sooner or later 
the question of membership of Ukraine and 
Moldova in the EU will be raised. Such a sce-
nario will only be possible if enormous com-
mitments are made by both countries in car-
rying out internal reforms. The EU must be 
prepared for just such development of events. 
More openness by the EU is required regard-
ing the inclusion of Eastern neighbours in EU 
policy as well as at least partly using models of 
cooperation with the EFTA countries. Reforms 
of the EU will most certainly be needed, new 
forms of EU institutions, as further enlarge-
ment to the East will not mean the existence 
of  EU-7+ but EU-35 or even EU-40, as at least 
some of the Western Balkans and EFTA coun-
tries will most definitely join the EU earlier. 
Obviously another scenario is also possible 
– the Eastern European countries will not take 
the EU up on their proposal and leave the road 
they are building to democracy. Such a devel-
opment of events would certainly not be ben-
eficial for the EU.
Among the Eastern European countries Belarus 
is a special case. At present it does not take ad-
vantage of the possibilities the ENP represents. 
It has not received any of the proposals that 
the EU has proposed to Ukraine and Moldova. 
The reason is the Alyaksandr Lukashenka au-
thoritarian regime, with which the EU keeps 
very limited relations. It is impossible to fore-
see if the situation in Belarus will remain as it 
is currently in the near future or if democracy 
will come about there. The EU should be pre-
pared for both scenarios. 
4 European Parliament, Report on the Commission’s 
007 enlargement strategy paper (007/71 (INI)), 
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The example of Belarus with which the EU has 
frozen political relations shows that the EU 
cannot limit its activities only to governing 
bodies. EU policies must also be directed at 
societies. This principle should be obligatory 
not just for ‘troublesome’ neighbouring coun-
tries such as Belarus, but also with neighbour-
ing countries which cooperate well with the 
EU. It is necessary to go outside and beyond 
traditional diplomacy. Contact with the societ-
ies of neihbouring countries cannot just be an 
addition to ‘serious’ policies but must become 
one of the fundamental elements of EU activ-
ity as regards its neighbours.  
It would seem that the problem of placement 
as regards the Southern Caucasus countries will 
remain. In the instance of these countries the 
question will still be if in the near future they 
will continue to remain in an undefined situa-
tion such as they are in today, where they are not 
part of Eastern European countries which are 
closer to the EU (Ukraine, Moldova) as well as 
neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean. 
The EU must make more decisions regarding 
the future of the Southern Caucasus countries. 
In the context of the Russian military actions 
in Georgia, aimed at politically subordinating 
this country, this decision should be made in 
as short a time as possible, as the situation in 
the Caucasus region is dynamic and can lead 
to a settlement, which will be extremely dif-
ficult to change. A natural solution would be 
to join them to Ukraine and Moldova, which 
have already received the ‘unnamed package’. 
EU summit decision to propose to Georgia visa 
facilitation measures and full and comprehen-
sive free trade area, is a first signal that the EU 
may in the future treat Georgia like Ukraine 
and Moldova. The issue of the future of the 
Southern Caucasus countries is part of the de-
bate regarding the final boundaries of the EU, 
which is certain to go on for the next decade.   
Summing up we can say that fulfilling the EU 
propositions by Eastern European countries, 
which the EU has proposed (and will probably 
continue to do so in the future) exclusively to 
countries in this region, will be the end of 
the current concept of the ENP as a common 
policy for Eastern and Southern neighbours. 
In the long term perspective the proposal of 
President Sarkozy concerning the Union for 
the Mediterranean and the Polish-Swedish 
Eastern Partnership will also act against the 
ENP in its current form.  
